War and Culture Studies in 2016. Putting 'translation' into the transnational?
In the inaugural edition of the Journal of War and Culture Studies, Martin Evans (Evans, 2008: 47-49) heralded the new journal as embracing a different type of war studies: 'It is about both representations and experience. It trains its critical sights on the creative interface between war, history, sociology and cultural studies. It promotes the exploration of multiple disciplines and different types of evidence to produce a more comprehensive and cumulative history of war ' (49) . Debra Kelly, in the same edition, provided a further gloss on the academic space which the discipline of War and Culture Studies, as defined by the Journal, was seeking to occupy: ' [...] the relationship between war and culture during conflict and its aftermath, the forms and practices of cultural transmission in time of war, and the analysis of the impact of war on cultural production, cultural identity and international cultural relations' (Kelly, 2008: 3-7, 4) . Now, nearly a decade later, how have these academic spaces, these 
Shifting borders, uneasy spaces
Any academic study which engages with war inevitably reflects, at least to some extent, the contemporary context of conflict and warmaking, often reading back from current events to reevaluate the cultures of past wars from newer perspectives.
Twenty-first century Coalition invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and their immediate
aftermaths arguably stimulated a renewed academic interest in very specific issues like the cultures of military coalitions (for example during the First World War, Heimburger, 2012) , the nature of interrogation and torture in war (Andrew & Tobia, 2014) , and the often asymmetrical interactions between occupation and relief (for example in the aftermath of World War Two in Europe, Humbert, 2015) . More fundamentally, over the past decade, the very frontiers of nation-states, the borders over which conflicts are so often fought, have been seen to be at one and the same time both key to any analysis we might make, and also infinitely shifting and malleable. What was once a more or less given in our work -the primacy of the nation-state -is a matter of very present reinterpretation and dispute. I would argue that there has been an increasing uncertainty over the past few years about the location of war -where exactly the conflicts we seek to explore are actually positioned geographically in relation to the nation-state.
To begin with, and perhaps surprisingly, the 'cultural turn' in war studies which Evans discerned some years ago has now migrated to the military themselves in what has been in effect a 'weaponizing' of culture (Rafael, 2007) in the service of the nationstate or of nation-state coalitions. This military cultural perspective is very different in intent and style from the propaganda uses of culture which have long been a staple of War and Culture Studies (for example Welch & Fox, 2012) .The fact that a 'cultural turn' has reached into the very core of Western defence thinking represents a quite remarkable change in traditional military ideology. From the 1980s through to the late twentieth century,Western military understandings of war were framed by what was then termed a 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), a trope which placed high level technology at the apex of capability, and imagined future conflicts as battles which would be fought from an optical distance, far away from any on the ground face to face encounters -the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 'Shock and Awe', stands as a classic example of this representation. In RMA, technological superiority was presumed to ensure a 'safe' victory, and above all, one at a considerable distance from the enemy.
By the late 1990s however, with peace-keeping in the Balkans, and particularly in the wake of 9/11, it became evident that troops would be entering foreign space on foot.
They would be occupying territory for quite considerable periods of time, and fighting enemies who were highly unconventional in military terms, who did not follow the so-called 'normal' rules of military encounter. In this situation, the received orthodoxy of technology and distance seemed irrelevant, and it was at this point that 'culture' entered decisively into the arsenal of military thinking. Spearheaded by LieutenantGeneral David Petraeus, 'cultural awareness' for the army was conceived as a 'force multiplier' (Petraeus, 2006:2-12, 2) . Effective counter-insurgency demanded, it was claimed, an informed understanding of the local foreign culture, and thus, in terms very similar to those traditionally used by academics in War and Culture Studies, environments would now need to be read culturally: 'The bottom line is that no handbook relieves a professional counter-insurgent from the personal obligation to study, internalize and interpret the physical, human and ideological setting in which the conflict takes place [...] to borrow a literary term, there is no substitute for a "close reading" of the environment' (Kilcullen, 2007) .
Epistemologically this acculturation of military thinking was framed at least initially by the discipline of anthropology. In the army's imaginary, the cultural space of war was essentially an informational one in which details about and products from human populations could be harvested to aid future military operations. These would then be summarized in a series of etiquette-type formulations to prepare soldiers before deployment, with e-learning 'do's and don'ts' (Arab Cultural Awareness 58 Factsheets, 2006) , and online feedback in the form of 'Culture Risk Meters ' (LineCo, 2009) , in some ways, an updated version of the handbooks for soldiers which had been produced in previous wars (see for example Constantine, 2013) . Despite the presence of clearly foreign interveners, the space of war was conceived as unchanging, with cultures largely defined within Manichean nation-state parameters, characterised by stasis and immobility, in a pre-lapsarian world in which cultures are approached via 'culture general competences' (Sands, 2009) . The putative intimacy imagined in this weaponizing of culture was one almost wholly dependent on the visible -on what could be seen by the soldiers. Indeed most participants on the ground of war were positioned as mute observers, transformed, as Derek Gregory suggested, into innocent and virtuous bystanders (Gregory, 2008) . Although some effort was made in military training programmes to relativise soldiers' perceptions of the foreign space in which they found themselves, the cultural imaginary was one, as Patrick Porter has argued, which was framed by a type of military orientalism, inhabited by 'othered' exotic objects (Porter, 2009:193) . Whilst this particular version of weaponized culture has in practice offered relatively little help to the military in achieving their specific objectives (see for example, Martin, 2014) , the parameters of the space imaginednation-state actors in a landscape largely devoid of cultural fluiditity and admixinghas tended to reinforce nation-state boundaries, with soldiers taking their nation-state with them, as it were, into the foreign domains of conflict.
If this military weaponizing of culture has reinforced a type of travelling nation-state ontology, the 2015 refugee crisis has had the contrary effect of refocusing attention on the impermanence of these very same national borders. In a real sense, our spatial Arguably, the location of war -within or beyond the nation-state -has seldom seemed as problematic as it now appears in 2016. On the whole, our analytical responses to this challenge of location have generally been to reconstitute the space in ways which prioritise comparisons, or which concentrate on the travels and connections across these borders. Studies of both the First and Second World Wars have provided new insights by setting Western national experiences alongside each other and reading across them. Most often, this has been a comparative exercise (Lagrou, 2008; Winter, 2016) . Following in the footsteps of Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann (2006), another approach which explicitly overrides borders has directed attention towards the notion of cultural transfer, sometimes called 'transculturalism', or 'histoire croisée'. Rather than starting with the nation-state, this perspective explores meeting points and the passage or transfer of cultures, the circulation of ideas, the key categories of cultural travellers, and their overlapping cultural spaces (Schmale, 2010) . Against this, proponents of transnational approaches have sought to recognise the nation-state as the basis of analysis, but from a starting-point which assumes a priori its positioning within a much wider world setting (Tyrrell, 2007) . In this disputed analytical terrain in which conceptual borders are as uneasy and oscillating as the nation-state frontiers they seek to challenge, the semantic field is wide and generous. Often the new 'buzzwords' of our conceptually uneasy terrain -'transnational', 'global', 'crossing of borders and generations' -are mixed together in a hopeful, if rather arbitrary, way as synonyms of somewhere 'beyond the nation-state', illustrating the problems we face in deciding the location of the wars whose cultures we propose to study in 2016.
Where is war?
There is a very real dilemma for us in incorporating the oscillating impermanence of actual and conceptual nation-state frontiers into our current imaginings of the spaces of war and culture without losing the 'creative interface' and cutting edge stimulus which Evans envisaged nearly ten years ago. I want to argue that our work in War and Culture Studies needs to engage overtly with a reconceptualization of the location of war as broader in both spatial and temporal terms than the nation-state. Should we be shifting from a discursive to a performative register which allows for an emphasis on corporeality and hybridity as modes of contact (Whatmore. 2002.147 this listening which involved an intricate process of considering the subject under discussion, the commentator's view of the subject, the audience for which the broadcast was intended, and the desired response to the broadcast. Once monitors had assessed the broadcast in this way, they then had to reconstruct the report for the intended consumer in the UK/US. This meant assessing the likely response and understanding of the consumers to each passage of the report. Following the production of a broadcast summary from the arrival of a monitor in the morning (to a shared listening office, with a rota of broadcasts to be listened to), through to the radio with its often poor reception, to the final production of a report was an extraordinary journey of the apparently ordinary performance of listening -as one monitor warned: Seeing the sites of war as translational spaces within the transnational involves above all a commitment to linguistic cultural transfer, to translation in its primary languagerelated meaning. As I've argued, if war is understood to be spatially transnationalwar and peace zones are inter-related, and Western wars and wars elsewhere were and are interconnected -this space must inevitably be multilingual, filled with cultural products and cultural analysis from a much broader range of sources than those we normally encounter.The problem in hearing this chorus of voices is obviously one of accessibility, and above all, of translation. The discipline of War and Culture Studies must surely now have the ambition to occupy an intercultural academic space in which the cultural products and academic reflections of our non-anglophone colleagues on wars which we have often omitted to notice will increasingly be available to hear and discuss. In this imagining, translation in the linguistic sense is not an optional extra, something useful to have in selected areas, but a project central to our future understanding of war and culture. The challenges Translation Studies poses, and the analytical frameworks it develops -issues of retranslation and renarration -are surely key to an intercultural understanding of war. In short, there is a strong case for the discipline of Translation Studies to become a leading contributor to War and Culture Studies in the years to come. This translational space also has implications for the ways in which we understand our own academic spaces, the means we employ to express and transmit the multivocal voices we hear. How do we translate the local in War and Culture Studies in our own academic work so that it humanizes and challenges the broader transnational contextualizations of war? The ethnographic historian Greg Dening (1994) , with a style which mixed narrative and reflective chapters, sought to be open to the performance of history, not as some kind of antiquarian re-enactment, but as what he believed was 'presenting the past' -finding ways of expressing, of catching processes, not just change, but the changing process too. Perhaps this 'storying' approach, this bringing alive and translating into the present the contact zones of war, may be achieved by continuing to be openminded about our definitions of academic contributions to the field of War and Culture Studies. All of these would be characterised by the academic rigour, accuracy and research which we rightly prize, and would be capable of adding to the mainstream development of the field, but they might also be expressed by drawing on different types of creative imaginationDening's mixture of narrative and reflective, exhibitions, novels, ethnographic history, poetry, artistic installations, posters.
In 2016, I think we cannot avoid the transnational, the uneasily oscillating borders of the nation-state.We can however ensure that we engage with the local in this space by translating -translating identities, including associations and networks of the material as well as of subjective identities. The subjects of our research would be translated by a conscious interdisciplinarity which might lead us to focus more on the performative than on the discursive and representational. Putting translation into the transnational would lead us to open out the spaces of War and Culture Studies to other wars and different cultural studies traditions. Above all, we would reaffirm the essential humannness of our endeavours by exploring ways of 'storying' the contact zones, marking the transnational with the diverse voices and forms of cultural production which may take us, as scholars, beyond our traditional academic comfort zones. This is a space in which translation and Translation Studies are key components, and in which the local, down to the personal, is the touchstone of our interest. In War and Culture Studies we perhaps have no need for a manifesto of the sort which Stephen Greenblatt so memorably prepared for 'cultural mobility' (2010), but we might collectively want to assert that the transnational contains translation at its core, and that translating the local in the context of uneasy nation-state borders may, in 2016, provide at least some of the 'creative interface' in War and Culture Studies which Evans so rightfully celebrated in 2008.
